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Abstract
For most of the Cold War, the United States attempted to maintain friendly relations with
the Communist nations comprising the Eastern Bloc, but with no other Soviet satellite was the
relationship as close as it was with Romania. No other member nation of the Warsaw Pact took
to the United States’ overtures so eagerly. Diplomatic relations between the United States and
the Romanian Communist government were established relatively early, almost immediately
following the end of the Second World War. However, it was not until 1968, when Romanian
dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu denounced the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, that the
Romanians finally gained the Americans’ trust. Ceauşescu’s 1968 speech attacking the Warsaw
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the diplomatic maneuverings surrounding it, was the
pivotal moment in the relationship between the two nations, fostering an amicable relationship
that would last well into the 1980s.

Keywords: Romania; Prague Spring; Ceausescu; Warsaw Pact; Communism; Cold War
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1. Introduction
In 1968, the Brezhnev Doctrine1 had its first trial run, with the military forces of the
Warsaw Pact invading Czechoslovakia in response to a wave of liberalization known as the
“Prague Spring”. Two member nations of the Warsaw Pact abstained from the invasion: the
German Democratic Republic, which was told by the Soviets to remain on standby2, and
Romania, which not only refused to take part, but openly denounced the invasion.3 This
denunciation, on first glance, seems astonishing: a socialist republic in the Soviet sphere of
influence openly rebelled against Moscow’s line, immediately after the very real threat of Soviet
reprisal for such deviations demonstrated that day in Czechoslovakia. This seemingly suicidal
gesture becomes much more understandable when the motivations of Romania’s dictator,
Nicolae Ceauşescu, are taken into account. Ceauşescu had a desire to establish Romania as an
independent nation, breaking with its previous role as a Soviet satellite state. In order to
accomplish this, he needed to appease the West, and demonstrate that, like the Yugoslavian
dictator Josip Broz Tito, he was one of the ‘good’ Communists. Furthermore, his dislike of the
invasion can be seen as a sort of condemnation in advance of any Soviet intervention in
Romania. If Czechoslovakia, which had been sending constant reassurances of loyalty to
Moscow,4 was not safe from invasion, what guarantee did an increasingly independent Romania

1

The Brezhnev Doctrine was the Soviet practice of defending their satellite regimes in Eastern Europe from popular
uprisings by any means necessary, up to and usually including the use of military force. While the Doctrine is named
for Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader in power during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, it had been in force
for far longer, being implemented by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, who used the Soviet Army to put down popular
uprisings in Hungary.
2
Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler, “Introduction”, in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw
Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, ed. Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler (Lanham:
Lexington Books), 16-17
3
Edward Behr, Kiss The Hand You Cannot Bite: The Rise and Fall of the Ceauşescus (New York: Villard Books,
1991), 158
4
Mark Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine”, in 1968: The World Transformed, ed.
Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 1998), 121-127
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have? Unknown to Ceauşescu and the United States,5 the Romanians actually risked very little,
as Brezhnev was more concerned with ideological, rather than economic, rebellion. As long as
Ceauşescu’s internal policies remained devoutly Stalinist, then he stood in little danger of Soviet
intervention, regardless of his external policies.6

5

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk, 24
August 1968, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Vol XVII: Eastern Europe, ed. James E. Miller and
Glenn W. LaFantasie (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 450 [FRUS]
6
It is worth noting that Ceauşescu, far from betraying Stalinism, only proved himself to a consummate student of
the philosophy’s namesake. Stalin himself had often misrepresented the USSR to outsiders in the 1930s, in order to
secure access to Western economic developments and the implementation of Western manufacturing methods in the
USSR.

2

2. Historiography
While much has been written about the Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact invasion
which followed, not nearly so much has been written about Romania’s role in either.7 It typically
warrants little more than a passing mention. Some scholars, however, are keener to examine the
role Romania played in the events.
Mark Kramer’s essay, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine”8 does not
focus on Romania exclusively; it does, however, give Romania greater attention than do many
essays written on the subject, treating it as a major player in the unfolding diplomatic crisis.
Kramer acknowledges the effects of Ceauşescu’s endorsement of Dubček9 had within the
Warsaw Pact, and of his dissention in general (an example Kramer cites in particular being
Ceauşescu’s diplomatic acknowledgement of West Germany, an action which infuriated the East
German regime).10
Interestingly, Edward Behr’s biography of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu, Kiss The Hand
You Cannot Bite: The Rise and Fall of the Ceauşescus, pays great attention to Ceauşescu’s
actions during both the Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. He
acknowledges that these months in 1968 were to serve as a defining moment for Ceauşescu,
where he was able to showcase his rebelliousness for the West to see, while doing very little
himself to emulate Dubček’s reforms in Romania.11 Behr also describes Ceauşescu’s behavior
right before his speech denouncing the Warsaw Pact’s invasion: the dictator was pacing

7

This applies to English-language works only; works written in German and Romanian have paid greater attention
to Romanian reactions to the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia.
8
Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine”
9
The leader of Czechoslovakia who initiated the reforms which led to the Prague Spring
10
Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine”, 127-129
11
Behr, Kiss The Hand You Cannot Bite, 155-158
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constantly, and obviously sweating.12 Descriptions like this, taken from sources close to
Ceauşescu, provide a useful insight into his excitable state of mind, and thus, into exactly how
great he estimated the threat of Soviet retaliation to be.
While not at all about the Prague Spring or Romania’s response to it, Mihai Pacepa’s
memoir Red Horizons provides an interesting look at Ceauşescu himself.13 Pacepa portrays
Ceauşescu as a very calculating figure, obsessed with not only an increasingly unrealistic fantasy
of an important, powerful Socialist Romania, but also with his own role in it. It is important to
keep in mind, however, that Pacepa was describing a different Ceauşescu than was acting in
1968, a Ceauşescu that had been influenced for the worst by his visits to North Korea and the
People’s Republic of China, and over a decade of being surrounded by sycophantic followers.
While there are echoes of the earlier Ceauşescu present (his cunning and political acumen hadn’t
yet begun to deteriorate), they remain just that, echoes.
It is also important to note that scholars have taken differing views of Red Horizons. In
Ceauşescu and the Securitate, Dennis Deletant praises Pacepa’s recollections, finding them to be
largely accurate in their portrayal of the Ceauşescus and their minions.14 John Sweeney,
however, disagrees, deriding Red Horizons as “no better than Bucharest secret policemen’s
gossip: sordid, dully pornographic, intrusive, morally repugnant, incoherent, and yet endlessly
fascinating.”15 Yet, despite such a strong statement, Sweeney is not entirely dismissive of Red
Horizons, quoting Ceauşescu’s translator Sergiu Celac as saying “in essence it is accurate.”16 It is
interesting to note that the Romanians Deletant and Celac seem to have a higher view of
12

Behr, Kiss The Hand You Cannot Bite, 155-158
Mihai Pacepa, Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief (Regnery Gateway: Washington, D.C., 1987)
14
Dennis Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989 (M.E. Sharpe:
Armonk, New York, 1995)
15
John Sweeney, The Life and Evil Times of Nicolae Ceauşescu (Hutchinson: London, 1991), 84
16
Sweeney, The Life and Evil Times of Nicolae Ceauşescu, 85
13
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Pacepa’s recollections than the British Sweeney. While this could indicate a bias towards
believing the worst of Ceauşescu out of resentment for his crimes, the scholarship behind
Deletant’s work and Celac’s close relationship with the Ceauşescus seem to indicate otherwise.
Deletant’s aforementioned book, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, provides an excellent
view of what the Romanian people lived through during Ceauşescu’s reign, going into great
detail as to the operations and methods of Ceauşescu’s security apparatus. While Deletant
discusses Ceauşescu’s speech, he does so largely from a security perspective, remarking on how
the Securitate immediately went to work designing an escape route for Ceauşescu in the event of
a Soviet invasion.17
While not explicitly about the Prague Spring or its aftermath, Vladimir Tismaneanu’s
Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism is a curious example of
how Ceauşescu’s actions during this period are often given very little attention. Despite his
cementing of his reputation as a so-called “maverick” communist in Western eyes, Tismaneanu
only dwells on this period of Ceauşescu’s reign for four pages.18 However, he does give these
events due credit in cementing the internal architecture of Ceauşescu’s Romania, citing the
failure of the Prague Spring as “justify[ing] the dogma of the indestructible unity of party, leader,
and nation.”19
Also, while not at all about the Prague Spring or Ceauşescu’s reaction, Elena Dragomir’s
article “The perceived threat of hegemonism in Romania during the second détente” is quite
useful in analyzing Ceauşescu’s actions during both the Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact

17

Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 84
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2003), 200-203
19
Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 203
18
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invasion which followed.20 She argues for a Romania which sought to steer a course that was
best for Romania, rather than simply pro-Soviet or pro-Western. This neatly explains the
dictator’s mindset, and helps in understanding why Ceauşescu did what he did at any given
moment.
Of great utility in describing events outside of Romania is The Prague Spring and the
Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, a collection of essays edited by Günter
Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler. The topics vary widely, covering almost every
country involved in the events in its own essay- except for Romania. Romania and/or Ceauşescu
are given passing mentions in the introduction21 and in Nikita Petrov’s contribution to the
collection,22 while Günter Bischof gives the subject greater attention, discussing Washington’s
fears about of a spillover from the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia into both Romania
and Yugoslavia.23
Romania’s omission from many English language sources on the Prague Spring and the
invasion which followed is an interesting gap in the literature, one which I have no explanation
for thus far. One of the few authors to focus on US-Romanian relations during this time (and the
only one I have found who specifically focuses on the nuclear reactor negotiations) is Eliza
Gheorghe.24 Using archival sources from the United States, Romania, and Russia, she argues that

20

Elena Dragomir, “The perceived threat of hegemonism in Romania during the second détente”, Cold War History
12, no. 1 (February 2012): 111-134
21
Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler, “Introduction” in, The Prague Spring and the Warsaw
Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, ed. Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler (Lanham:
Lexington Books, 2010), 16-17
22
Nikita Petrov, “The KGB and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968: Preconditions for the Soviet Invasion and
Occupation of Czechoslovakia”, in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,
149
23
Günter Bischof, “The Johnson Administration and the Warsaw Pact Invasion” in, The Prague Spring and the
Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, 221-223
24
Eliza Gheorghe, “Atomic Maverick: Romania's negotiations for nuclear technology, 1964–
1970”, Cold War History 13, no. 3 (August 2013): 373-392.
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Ceauşescu used diplomatic maneuvering as a backchannel for negotiations between the United
States and North Vietnam, pretending to be more helpful than he actually was in order to gain
American support for his acquisition of a nuclear reactor. While she argues her point well (and
has certainly conducted exhaustive research), I disagree that Romanian diplomatic efforts in
regards to Vietnam were ultimately responsible for the good relations Romania came to enjoy
with the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s; instead, I take the view that this was
accomplished by Ceauşescu’s speech denouncing the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968.

7

3. US-Romanian Relations Prior to August 1968
Romania had always been a sort of outlier in the Warsaw Pact. Not considered essential
to the military cohesion of the alliance, and with a very low level of industrialization compared
to other Communist nations, Khrushchev attempted to assign Romania the role of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance’s (CMEA) breadbasket in 1961.25 Rather than giving the
Romanians the same level of industrial aid that other CMEA members were receiving, the
Soviets simply wanted the Romanians to feed the other members of the CMEA, and to import all
industrial goods. The initiative failed, but the fact that it had been attempted prompted
Romania’s dictator, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, to begin to form a Romanian foreign policy
independent of Moscow’s directives.
It is important to note that until this time, Romania’s relationship with Moscow under
Gheorghiu-Dej had been (for the most part) amicable. During the Hungarian uprising of 1956, he
dutifully followed the Moscow party line, and ordered the Department of State Security
(Securitate), to crack down on all dissenters. As a reward for showing such an eagerness to obey
Moscow’s directives, Khrushchev ordered the withdrawal of all Soviet Army units stationed in
Romanian territory.26
On the one hand, Gheorghiu-Dej followed the Moscow line when it suited him. On the
other hand, he rejected Moscow’s directives in regards to the Romanian economy and its role in
the greater CMEA plan. Doing so had little, if anything, to do with actual economic
development. Following the CMEA directives most likely would have led to a thriving economy.
The CMEA called for Romania to harvest its abundant natural resources for export to other,

25
26

Mark Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine”, 119
Behr, Kiss The Hand You Cannot Bite, 128-129
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resource-poor members of CMEA in exchange for industrial goods that the Romanians would be
unable to produce themselves.27 However, in Gheorghiu-Dej’s eyes, this would lead to a loss of
independence for Romania, an independence that was already flimsy, given the nature of
Romania’s patrons in Moscow. Furthermore, the exports would be primarily to other socialist
nations, not to the West, and thus would not garner the hard currency that was perennially in
short supply among the Eastern Bloc nations. For these reasons, Romania’s foreign policy began
to veer off the Soviets’ favored course, and began to be more about Romania and its national
interests, rather than Romania, cog in the great CMEA/Warsaw Pact machine.
It was during this time that Gheorghiu-Dej appointed a new foreign minister, who was to
have an important effect on U.S.-Romanian relations in the years to come, Corneliu Mănescu.
Mănescu was to form a close working relationship with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk.28
Both men, and their masters, would go to great lengths to improve relations between their
respective countries, particularly in the area of trade.
President John F. Kennedy had shown great interest in expanding trade with Eastern
Europe, and Secretary Dean Rusk made sure to inform Mănescu that President Lyndon B.
Johnson was not only inclined to continue this policy, but to single out Romania for preferential
treatment, given the “stress over [the] past year on “national independence and sovereignty” in
pursuit [of] its economic policy and other objectives”. The message was unmistakable: keep
moving away from the Soviet sphere, and the U.S. will be more inclined to engage in trade. The
precedent had clearly been set by Yugoslavia, which had been receiving significant economic,
agricultural, and military aid from the United States since the 1950s, despite opposition from
27

Behr, Kiss The Hand You Cannot Bite, 130-131
Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State, 26 February 1964, FRUS 1964-1968, XVII,
381-385

28
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such illustrious anti-Communist hardliners as Senator Joseph McCarthy.29 Between the inroads
made by American trade and the relatively relaxed communism practiced under Josip Broz
Tito,30 Yugoslavia was by the 1960s engaged in Western trade amounting to 68 percent of its
total foreign trade.31 Whether Romania was hoping to follow this example in order to gain access
to American military technology, simple civilian trade, or perhaps even something else, would be
revealed in due course.
The next major event in furthering relations between the United States and Romania was
the 1965 death of dictator Gheorghiu-Dej, who had ruled since 1948. Despite not being named as
his successor, Nicolae Ceauşescu followed the precedent set by Stalin (who had also not been
named as Lenin’s successor) and was elected General Secretary of the Romanian Communist
Party.32 At first, no noticeable effect could be discerned from the American standpoint: a meeting
of the Export Control Board held in April of 1965 never even mentioned the change in
leadership, and the attendees concerned themselves with petroleum trade, the ongoing struggle
for MFN recognition, and other issues from the Gheorghiu-Dej era.33
Ceauşescu’s rise to power was hardly a foregone conclusion. A peasant’s son, he joined
the Communist Party in his teens, and spent much of World War II in a fascist Romanian prison
camp, serving another detainee as his manservant. That detainee was none other than the
communist Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who never forgot about Nicolae once he became the

29

Memorandum from Gerald R. Siegel to Senator Johnson, 21 June 1956, LBJA Subject File [Foreign Relations]
[Yugoslavia], Box 69, Lyndon Baines Johnson Archive, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library [LBJL]
30
Yugoslavian partisan leader (1941-1945) and Communist dictator (1945-1980)
31
Tvrtko Jakovina, “Tito, the Bloc-Free Movement, and the Prague Spring”, in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw
Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, ed. Bischof, Karner, and Ruggenthaler, 397
32
Behr, Kiss The Hand You Cannot Bite, 137
33
Minutes of Meeting of the Export Control Review Board, 1 April 1965, FRUS 1964-1968, XVII, 405-413
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dictator of communist Romania.34 He was placed in charge of the political department of the
Romanian army in 1948, supervising a true-to-form Stalinist purge of its officer corps and being
granted the rank of major general, despite never having served so much as a day in the armed
forces prior to this appointment.35
In order to fulfill his new duties, Ceauşescu was sent off to study in the U.S.S.R., at the
elite Frunze Military Academy; given what his job entailed, this is hardly surprising. What is
surprising is that his contemporaries assert that, even at this early stage, “he couldn’t stand the
Russians.” Given how fanatical the young Ceauşescu was in serving his masters in Bucharest
and Moscow, it would make more sense for him to have adored Stalin’s servants, but even at this
stage, his Romanian nationalism appeared to be surfacing alongside his dedication to the
communist ideal. It was this combination, in a more mature form, that was to have a significant
impact, for better and for worse, on Romania during his reign.
Ceauşescu continued his ascent through the Communist Party ranks, backed the entire
time by Gheorghiu-Dej, who eventually appointed him to oversee all Party organizations and
cadres.36 In effect, anytime someone received a promotion, it went through Ceauşescu’s office,
allowing him to build up a considerable power base for himself, one which would allow him to
assume the post of General Secretary after Gheorghiu-Dej’s death, even against his mentor’s
deathbed objections to such an eventuality. That this occurred at all represents an interesting

34

Behr, Kiss The Hand You Cannot Bite, 86
Behr, Kiss The Hand You Cannot Bite, 119
36
Ibid 126
35
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parallel with the political career of Joseph Stalin, who also slowly acquired absolute power over
the objections of the previous leader.37
While Ceauşescu was hardly the man Moscow wanted as General Secretary of an allied
state, he lacked the desire for true reform which would later characterize his Czechoslovakian
counterpart Dubček, which is perhaps why Ceauşescu was not invited to step down by the Soviet
Army. Ceauşescu continued his predecessor’s policies, and was possessed of an even greater
independent streak than Gheorghiu-Dej had been. His policies, both domestic and foreign, would
annoy the Soviets enough to lead the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Petro
Shelest, to deride Ceauşescu as “at the very least extremely suspect as a communist.”38 While
Ceauşescu was, at times, more Machiavellian than Communist ideologue, the two did tend to
dovetail: Ceauşescu had a vision of a Communist Romania, made by Romanians for Romanians,
with himself at the helm. That he would often temper his idealism with cold pragmatism hardly
made him any less of a diehard Stalinist, as his rampant use of secret police to crush dissent and
lack of reform in the 1980s readily attest to.
Ceauşescu was also rather active in attempting to build up Romania’s industrial might.
To achieve this end, he decided that he needed to do a little shopping. However, rather than
approaching the Soviet Union, which would most likely be uninterested in assisting its rebellious
satellite drift ever-further away from its ordained economic role in COMECON, Ceauşescu
instead turned to the West. In a 1967 meeting with US Ambassador to Romania Richard H.

37

In Stalin’s case, the objections came not from the deathbed, but from beyond the grave, in the form of Lenin’s
Testament. Given that the document condemned nearly the entire Soviet leadership, Stalin had no difficulty in
finding allies to help suppress the document, most of whom he would later have executed during his bloody rise to
power.
38
Nikita Petrov, “The KGB and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968: Preconditions for the Soviet Invasion and
Occupation of Czechoslovakia”, in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,
ed. Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler, 149
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Davis, Ceauşescu made a personal appeal for the strengthening of trade relations between the
two countries, going to far as to liken them of having a love affair.39 That Ceauşescu would make
this appeal in person, rather than allowing Mănescu to handle it, speaks to the importance he
attached to this meeting.
Ceauşescu did not, however, confine his cultivation of American political figures solely
to those who currently walked the corridors of power. In early 1967, former Vice President
Richard M. Nixon, having been denied a Polish visa, was allowed entry into Romania. Expecting
a cold reception, Nixon was quite surprised to be welcomed with open arms by a friendly
populace, being received personally by Ceauşescu.40 That Ceauşescu would seek to cultivate
Nixon, who at that time was still a down and out politician,41 was evidence of Ceauşescu’s keen
political acumen. This foresight was to pay big dividends in years to come, as Nixon transitioned
from yesterday’s news to President of the United States– and he never forgot that “when others
had turned their backs on him, Ceauşescu and the Romanians had treated him royally.”42
In retrospect, it is obvious that he was angling for something, with his ‘love affair’
remark being particularly revealing: here he seems to have been behaving like a gold-digging
lover, buttering up a wealthy partner in anticipation of asking for a present. Trade relations alone
were not going to provoke this behavior out of Ceauşescu, but something else certainly would.
The dictator was after something bigger: a nuclear reactor plant and several state-of-the-art IBM
computers.

39

Airgram from the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State, 3 February 1967, FRUS 1964-1968, XVII,
422-426
40
Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 281-282
41
Having lost the 1960 Presidential and 1962 California Governor’s elections
42
Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician 1962-1972 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 108
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The first mention of Mănescu broaching the issue of acquiring a nuclear reactor was in
April of 1968, right in the middle of the Prague Spring.43 However, there is a reference to a
previous attempt by the Romanians to purchase a heavy water reactor in the United States that
was blocked by the U.S. government.44 In this second attempt, the Romanians had decided to
purchase a Canadian reactor, but were seeking U.S. approval for the sale. This demonstrates that
all was not well between Romania and its Soviet allies. After all, the Soviets had extensive
nuclear experience– why did the Romanians not ask for Soviet assistance? This question would
not have been lost on the Americans, which perhaps explains their hesitance to provide/agree to
their ally providing nuclear technology to a nation that was, technically, in the Soviet sphere of
influence.
Before any further discussion of the reactor deal took place, Secretary Rusk, growing
more and more concerned by developments in Czechoslovakia, sought out Mănescu to grill him
for any insider information he could provide about a possible Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia.45 This demonstrates the U.S. view of the Romanians, especially of Foreign
Minister Mănescu, quite clearly: while they were still communists, they were also becoming
trusted communists, and had the advantage of being in the Warsaw Pact, something the U.S.’s
other communist friend, Yugoslavia, was not. Mănescu was more than happy to cooperate,
indicating that unless denials were issued from Prague and Moscow about Soviet troop

43

Memorandum of Conversation, 11 April 1968, FRUS 1968-1968, XVII, 440-443
Memorandum of Conversation, 11 April 1968, FRUS 1968-1968, XVII, 440-443; “The Ambassador recalled that
Romania had approached a US concern sometime ago in connection with obtaining heavy water technology, but that
this apparently had encountered some problems on the part of the American Government.”
45
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania, 10 May 1968, FRUS 1964-1968, XVII, 443444
44
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movements towards Czechoslovakia, he felt that there was definitely some credence to the
rumors, and that the situation had become “very serious”.46
The situation was not so serious, however, that the Romanians weren’t right back at work
presenting their wish list to the American Santa Claus. No longer was the reactor good enough;
now, the Romanians were in negotiations with Goodyear to build a rubber processing plant, and
also wanted to purchase a circuit plant from IBM. Romanian Ambassador to the U.S. Corneliu
Bogdan was informed that the reactor was under consideration, but no reply was made regarding
the new requests. When asked about the situation in Czechoslovakia, Bogdan opined that the
situation would remain under control, and discussed the differences between the Prague Spring
and the Hungarian uprising in 1956. In 1956 the Hungarians had abjured communism and left
the Warsaw Pact, whereas Czechoslovakia had done neither. He did admit, however, that he had
no information regarding the five-nation summit in Moscow in May of 1968, which was
debating on how exactly to respond to the increasingly liberal reforms in Czechoslovakia.47
The Czechoslovakian situation was put on the backburner for the time being, in the
context of discussions between the U.S. and Romania. The Romanian Deputy Prime Minister,
Alexandru Birladeanu, visited the U.S., and joined his voice with Mănescu’s and Bogdan’s in
petitioning the United States government to allow the sale of a heavy water reactor to Romania.

46

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania, 10 May 1968, FRUS 1964-1968, XVII, 443444
47
Memorandum for the Record (Subject: Luncheon Conversation with Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan of the
Romanian Embassy), 15 May 1968, FRUS 1964-1968, XVII, 444-446

15

Secretary Rusk informed him, strictly off-the-record, that the prospects for such a sale were
improving, and that approval could be possible before September.48
Birladeanu then proceeded to add another item to the Romanian wish list. No longer were
the factories and nuclear power plant enough, now the Romanians wanted to purchase
computers. This turned out to be fairly easy. Secretary Rusk informed Birladeanu to contact the
manufacturer in question, who would in turn know the proper protocol to get the Department of
Commerce to approve the sale. Furthermore, preliminary discussions about a possible student
exchange program were opened up by Birladeanu, receiving a positive response from Secretary
Rusk.49
Everything seemed to be looking up in between the two nations, with trade set to
increase, the long sought reactor supposedly close to approval, confident assurances by
Romanian diplomats that the Czechoslovakian crisis was going to be resolved peacefully, and a
possible student exchange in the works. Then the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia
happened, and with uncertainty as to who, if anyone, would be the Soviet’s next target,
everything that had been achieved thus far was placed in jeopardy.
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4. The Prague Spring
In order to fully explain what happened in the latter half of 1968, it is necessary to revisit
the first half of that year, and examine just what happened in Czechoslovakia. As has been
demonstrated by the conversations between American and Romanian diplomats, by May of
1968, the series of reforms in Czechoslovakia which had become known as the “Prague Spring”
was being discussed the world over. High-level Western diplomats sought any information they
could get about the Prague Spring from their Eastern Bloc counterparts.
What became known as the Prague Spring began in January of 1968, when Alexander
Dubček was elected to the post of First Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party,
replacing the unpopular hardline Stalinist Antonín Novotný.50 Following an almost immediate
implementation of economic reforms and liberalization of the economy, Dubček also initiated
political liberalization and almost entirely restored freedom of the press. Almost immediately,
the Soviet leadership called Dubček to Moscow for consultations, demanding that he rein in the
storm he had unleashed within the Warsaw Pact. Dubček attempted to comply with Moscow’s
wishes, but to no avail; the Prague Spring had quickly grown beyond the ability of the
communist leadership to control. Demonstrations demanding similar reforms occurred in Poland
in March of 1968.51 That same month, the KGB reported that similar ideas were spreading
among disaffected Soviet youth; astonishingly, reports from as late as November of 1968 claim
that Soviet university students were interested in “replicating the Czechoslovak experience in
[the Soviet Union].”52
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Considering the rapid spread of what Walter Ulbricht labeled the Czechoslovak
“contagion”53, Soviet concerns quickly grew to considerable alarm. Hardliners were ousted from
government and party positions, and both the Czechoslovakian army and secret police, both
traditional power bases for communist governments, were overhauled, significantly curtailing
direct Soviet influence over both.
By mid-March, KGB chief Yuri Andropov stated that the Prague Spring was “very
reminiscent of what happened in Hungary”54, a sentiment no doubt echoed by much of the Soviet
leadership. In fact, the Hungarians themselves found uncomfortable parallels between the
ongoing Prague Spring reforms and those which had taken place in Hungary in 1956. Hungarian
party boss Jànos Kàdàr observed that the reforms were “extremely similar to the prologue of the
Hungarian counterrevolution… we ask you to give that some thought.”55 Leonid Brezhnev, the
general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who had earlier supported
Dubček, now began to take a dim view of him, feeling that he had no real interest in
implementing the Soviet directives at all.56
Among other members of the Warsaw Pact, Dubček’s reforms proved to be even less
popular. Walter Ulbricht of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Władysław Gomułka
of Poland, fearing similar events in their own countries57, screamed the longest and the loudest,
making increasingly alarmist claims about the supposed virulence of the ‘counterrevolutionary’
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Prague Spring reforms.58 Ulbricht and Gomułka had a point, too– Polish authorities were forced
to put down multiple student protests in Warsaw and elsewhere, where banners were carried
demanding a Polish equivalent of Dubček. Gomułka was not amused, and became the first
Warsaw Pact leader to openly denounce the reforms in Czechoslovakia. Ulbricht was not very
far behind; with Ceauşescu’s increasingly independent Romania having established diplomatic
relations with West Germany, he did not want Dubček’s Czechoslovakia to become the second
Warsaw Pact member to do so.59
As yet more reform programs were adopted by Dubček in the spring of 1968, the Soviet
military began drawing up invasion plans, in the event that a peaceful solution to the
Czechoslovakian crisis could not be reached. Perhaps more importantly, Brezhnev had become
convinced that an example would need to be made of Czechoslovakia, and that after such an end
had been accomplished, “everyone will know it’s not worth fooling around with us.”60
The American approach was initially hands-off. With the memories of the Hungarian
Uprising of 1956 still fresh in many peoples’ minds, no one wanted to encourage another
anticommunist revolution only to watch it crumble before the Soviet army.61 Dubček encouraged
this policy, not wanting to give the other members of the Warsaw Pact (especially the Soviets)
any pretext for an invasion. For his part, Secretary Rusk informed Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin,
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as the situation in Czechoslovakia deteriorated, that any use of military force by the Soviet Union
against the Dubček regime would seriously damage U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.62
Meanwhile, in Romania, Ceauşescu praised Dubček and his fellow reformists to the stars.
While Ceauşescu was a dyed-in-the-wool Stalinist, and had no intentions of following Dubček’s
reforms in Romania, he had no trouble hopping on the bandwagon in the hopes of garnering
Western favor, while at the same time not truly annoying the Soviets with any major internal
changes that could be construed as ‘counterrevolutionary’. More importantly, he made clear that
any attempt by a foreign power, even the U.S.S.R., to interfere in Romania militarily would be
met with armed resistance.63
Such a strong declaration that Romania would defend itself, even against fellow socialist
states, was hardly the end of Ceauşescu’s mischief. On August 16, only a few days before the
invasion, Ceauşescu and Dubček signed a treaty of “Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual
Assistance” in Prague. The question many were asking at this point was not how far Romania
was willing to go to defend its sovereignty, but how much assistance it was willing to lend
Czechoslovakia in the event of a Soviet invasion. The world would get its answer within five
days, when Warsaw Pact forces crossed into Czechoslovakian territory.
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5. The Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia
On the night of August 21, a coalition of Soviet, Polish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian forces
crossed the border into Czechoslovakia; the East German army, while on standby, was excluded
from the invasion, much to Ulbricht’s fury.64 Romania did not participate. Far more than the
Soviets, the other members of the Warsaw Pact invasion were almost rabid in their denunciation
of the Dubček regime, calling for the imposition of martial law by Soviet forces, who had very
quickly (and with no opposition from the Czechoslovakian military and security forces) seized
control of Czechoslovakia.65 Dubček and his fellow leaders were placed under arrest and airlifted
to Moscow, while the Soviets scrambled to put an interim government into place and undo the
damage that the Prague Spring had wrought.66
In all fairness to Brezhnev and the U.S.S.R., he was more or less goaded into the invasion
by his Warsaw Pact allies. Every time he would attempt to reach a concession with Dubček,
Ulbricht and Gomułka would belt out another diatribe against the man. Dubček’s own hesitance
to implement event he mildest Soviet ‘suggestions’ did not help matters. Following a series of
conferences, held in the cities of Čierná nad Tisou in Hungary and Bratislava in Czechoslovakia
in early August, Brezhnev still held out hope that Dubček would acquiesce, and that a peaceful
resolution to the situation might yet be found. He stayed in contact with Dubček during a sojourn
to the Crimea, where the scales tipped in favor of an invasion once and for all.67
While Brezhnev was screaming at Dubček that he had “blatantly sabotag[ed] the
agreements reached in Čierná and Bratislava”, Dubček informed the Soviet leader that he should
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“adopt whatever measures” Brezhnev felt were necessary. In a tragic misunderstanding,
Brezhnev took this to mean that Dubček would tolerate Soviet military intervention, and was
perhaps asking for it. So, with what was mistaken for a plea for help on the one hand, and the
yapping dogs Ulbricht and Gomułka baying for Dubček’s blood and an end to the reforms of the
Prague Spring, Brezhnev gave the order to proceed.68
In the wake of the invasion, Ceauşescu saw his chance to finally cement his ‘maverick’
credentials to the West (particularly the Americans). Whereas the other Warsaw Pact leaders had
praised the invasion, and called for still greater measures to be taken against the Dubček regime,
Ceauşescu completely broke ranks and formally denounced the invasion in a public speech in
Bucharest the morning after the invasion.69 He held nothing back, denouncing the invasion not
just in the name of peace, but in the name of the worldwide socialist movement: “[T]he entry of
the forces of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia is a great error and a serious danger
to peace in Europe and to the fate of socialism in the world.” 70
Ceauşescu’s phrasing couldn’t have been better. Ceauşescu’s criticism of the Soviets in a
fashion that they would find particularly reprehensible– denouncing them as having done great
harm to the worldwide socialist movement– would play well with other socialist states that
wished for greater self-determination, while simultaneously drawing Western attention to yet
another a potential split within the Eastern bloc. Even if unintentional, Ceauşescu’s statements
accomplished the former admirably, given Ceauşescu’s later alliances with semi-rogue
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communist leaders such as North Korea’s Kim Il-Sung.71 He certainly achieved the latter, if the
amount of foreign aid and investment which was to pour into Romania in the coming years is
any indication.
Ceauşescu was not content at stopping there. He went on to claim that “[t]here is no
justification whatsoever, and there can be no excuse for accepting even for a moment the idea of
military intervention in the affairs of a fraternal socialist state.” On the face of it, he appears to be
talking about Czechoslovakia. But much of that last statement, in Ceauşescu’s mind, was most
likely actually about Romania and his own deviation from the Moscow line, not about Dubček’s.
Ceauşescu had deviated from the Moscow line since he took power, as had Gheorghiu-Dej
before him.72
Ceauşescu went on elaborate: “…choosing the ways of socialist construction is a problem
of each party, of each state, and of every people, and nobody can set himself up as an adviser and
guide for the way in which socialism must be built.” This message was intended not just for
Washington, but for Moscow– stay out of Romanian affairs. Ceauşescu wanted to make clear
that it was for the Romanian people (by that, read Ceauşescu) to decide exactly how Romania
would proceed in its affairs, and no one– not even the Soviet Union– had any right to tell them
what to do. Such a bold statement would only further Ceauşescu’s credentials as a “maverick”
communist.73
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In what was perhaps Ceauşescu’s boldest statement, he presumed to decry the Soviet
Union and the invading Warsaw Pact nations as not only having hurt the worldwide communist
movement, but as not being communist themselves: “We are convinced that no Communist can
be found who can accept this military action in Czechoslovakia, that all the Communists would
raise their voices to ensure the triumph of freedom, the triumph of the Marxist-Leninist
principles, so that Czechoslovak people, so that the peoples, may be able to build socialist
society as they themselves want it.”74
While Ceauşescu’s deviations were not quite in the same league as Dubček’s, being
primarily foreign policy oriented, they still represented deviance. With the Soviets clearly in a
mood to clean house, and return its European satellites to full compliance with the gospel of
Marxism-Leninism as preached from their pulpit in Moscow, could he afford to remain
unrepentant and continue in his dealings with the West? Refusal to do so ran the risk of
prompting a Soviet invasion, it also seem to hint at a better future for Romania (and, by
extension, Ceauşescu himself), while a return to unquestioning compliance with Moscow would
only condemn Romania to ‘enjoy’ the same lackluster economics and mediocre living standards
as the rest of the Eastern Bloc. Facing these paths, Ceauşescu chose to wager what independence
his country had managed to acquire thus far, and publically sided against the Soviets that August
morning.
There is every sign Ceauşescu knew exactly what risk he was taking; sources close to the
dictator state that prior to his speech, he was pacing constantly, and obviously sweating.75 He
knew that, should his speech touch a nerve in Moscow, Romania might be next in the Soviet
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crusade to restore Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy (or at least the Soviet view of it) in its satellites.
He was also aware, however, that this was a golden opportunity, a chance to now and forever
secure Romania’s right to shape its own foreign policy and make economic decisions free of
interference from Moscow. If Ceauşescu knuckled under, or if Romania was subject to an
invasion, it would almost certainly revert to the status it had held in the 1950s, with its foreign
and economic policy dictated by Moscow, as had happened in Hungary following the 1956
uprising.
In Washington, Ambassador Bogdan met with Deputy Under Secretary for European
Affairs Charles Bohlen, where he reiterated Ceauşescu’s denunciation of the invasion, but also
made clear that Romania had no intention of leaving the Warsaw Pact.76 Romania choosing to
remain in the Warsaw Pact makes a certain sort of sense; while Ceauşescu may have engaged in
negotiations with the West to secure economic and technological gains, he remained essentially a
Stalinist leader, displaying no hints of leaving the Warsaw Pact, unlike Czechoslovakia. So long
as Ceauşescu maintained his commitment to the Warsaw Pact, and avoided any true
liberalization, he most likely would be safe from Soviet invasion.77
While early intelligence reports predict that Ceauşescu would indeed be safe from
invasion, they did not rule out the prospect altogether,78 and rumors of a Soviet invasion of
Romania were to persist until the end of the year. Following Ceauşescu’s speech, National
Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow alerted President Johnson that United Press International was
reporting a Soviet ultimatum to Bucharest: “Ceauşescu must resign or [the Warsaw Pact] will
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invade.”79 The next day, even more sensational news was reported by Radio Free Europe, which
claimed a Hungarian news outlet was reporting that the invasion had begun.80
On August 24, a memorandum was forwarded to Secretary Rusk regarding possible
American actions following a Soviet invasion of Romania.81 No plans were made to interfere or
to provide any sort of assistance to Romania if the Warsaw Pact decided to bring its other
wayward member back into line. Such plans were made, however, in the event that, not content
with bringing Romania back into the fold, Moscow decided to move on Yugoslavia next,
restoring almost all of Stalin’s postwar empire.82
If Romania were to be invaded, then the fourth recommendation in the memorandum
called for “preparations permitting us to extend military assistance to Yugoslavia if Tito requests
it.”83 This demonstrates the pecking order of the United States’ communist friends immediately
following the Prague Spring: while Romania was a good friend, and Ceauşescu had become the
man of the hour with his denunciation of the invasion, it was still a member of the Warsaw Pact,
and ultimately lay within the Soviet sphere of influence established at Yalta in 1945.84 If
Brezhnev decided to invade, the United States was hardly going to stand in his way. The same
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could not be said for Yugoslavia, which had apparently been out of Moscow’s orbit for long
enough85 as to qualify for American assistance.
While this seems to be a poor reward for Ceauşescu’s defiant stand against the Soviet
juggernaut, it is important to remember that not even a week had passed since the invasion of
Czechoslovakia when Rusk received this memorandum. In Washington, D.C., the new
perception of Ceauşescu had yet to take hold, but when it did, it was to be unshakable for nearly
two decades. Even when Ceauşescu abjured the limited liberal reforms that had characterized his
early reign, and transformed Romania into what was arguably86 “the most totalitarian of the
entire Eastern Bloc”87, Western leaders still invited him to prestigious events in the West. As late
as 1983, Vice President George H. W. Bush referred to him as “the good communist”.88
By August 27, Ceauşescu’s diplomats had begun working their magic in Washington.
Whereas before, CIA reports had described the reports made by the Romanians as “typical of
Bucharest… when under pressure”89, Walt Rostow was now insisting that President Johnson
“think hard” about an “ominous” Romanian proposal to intervene on Romania’s behalf by telling
Moscow that they had gone far enough, and that further invasions could “interrupt” the
American policy of détente.90 As outlined in that memo, US Ambassador George Ball met with
Foreign Minister Mănescu, who was still in New York for the UN General Assembly, the
following day. While Mănescu was curious as to what the American response would be in the
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event of an invasion- and what pressures the US would exert to prevent such an eventuality- he
and Ball agreed that the threat of military force was not an option.91
Mănescu got his answer two days later. President Johnson, while following the
established policy of non-intervention in the Soviet sphere (Eisenhower had allowed the Soviet
army to crush uprisings in the GDR in 1953, and again in Hungary in 1956)92, denounced the
invasion publically in a speech delivered in San Antonio, Texas, on August 30, 1968. In his
speech, he hinted at the possibility of further invasions in Eastern Europe, and clearly spelled out
American opposition to a continuation of Moscow’s military interventionism.93 The President’s
speech was not, however, bellicose; on the contrary, Johnson called for a peaceful resolution to
the situation, stating that he knew of “no questions that … cannot be settled and should not be
settled by peaceful means.”94 While Johnson delivering his speech, however, the CIA was
receiving reports on Warsaw Pact troop movements which, while not a guaranteed indicator of
an imminent invasion of Romania, were hardly encouraging either.95
Johnson certainly got the Romanians’ attention with his not-so-subtle hints about
“rumors” that “this action might be repeated elsewhere”. The very next day, Ambassador
Bogdan was on the phone with Secretary Rusk, asking what exactly the Americans knew that the
Romanians did not. Rusk explained that the President’s remarks about Eastern Europe had been
prompted by ambiguous Soviet troop movements, and that the Americans knew nothing
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conclusive, but had made inquiries regarding the situation to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.
Bogdan expressed appreciation for the President’s consideration, and informed Rusk that
Mănescu would be remaining in New York until Soviet intentions became known. 96
Mănescu did not have long to wait; Dobrynin got back to the Americans within a day,
informing them that the Soviet leadership had no plans for any additional invasions, against
Romania or otherwise.97 Ambassador Davis conveyed this to a very relieved Romanian Acting
Foreign Minister Sandru, who thanked Davis for the information and gave his assurance that
Ceauşescu would “appreciate it.”98 That Ceauşescu would appreciate this information seems
obvious. Not only had he publically condemned the actions of a Soviet leader that he detested,
and escaped from Soviet retaliation, but he had done so in a way which played very well with the
United States, and with the world as a whole. He was no longer just another Eastern European
communist dictator; now, he was one of the “good communists”.99
Still, even though he had American assurances that Romania was safe, Ceauşescu
remained wary, and understandably so. The American assurances were, in fact, based on Soviet
assurances that Romania was safe. Between this rather paltry evidence, and the continuing
presence of multiple Warsaw Pact divisions stationed dangerously close to the Romanian border,
Ceauşescu felt far from safe. He sent Foreign Minister Mănescu, recently returned from New
York to Bucharest, around to see U.S. Ambassador Davis. Davis reported that he had, “little
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doubt that Mănescu came from seeing Ceauşescu… as he was five minutes late for our
appointment.”100
Mănescu came under orders to convey not just Ceauşescu’s personal gratitude to
President Johnson for his support, but also the gratitude of the Romanian people. He praised
Johnson’s speech on August 30, which he felt had had a “cooling effect” on the tense situation in
Eastern Europe following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. He further thanked
Davis for the U.S.’s discretion in assuring the Soviets that President Johnson’s statement was not
made based on information provided by the Romanians. Davis reported that when he told
Mănescu that Johnson’s support was not just that of his administration, but was a U.S. policy that
should continue, Mănescu “did not presume to advise on how this could be done”101, but
indicated the full support of the Romanian government towards such an end. There was hardly
another answer that Mănescu could give; Ceauşescu clearly wanted to continue to enjoy
American goodwill, if only long enough to obtain his long-sought after nuclear reactor, computer
equipment, and other economic benefits.
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6. US-Romanian Relations, September-December 1968
The backlash of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia would dominate Eastern Bloc
politics for the remainder of 1968 (and, indeed, all the way until 1989). Amidst all the conflicting
reports that Washington was receiving was an interesting piece of intelligence passed along by a
source within the Romanian Communist Party’s Central Committee: Soviet leaders Kosygin,
Suslov and Ponomarev had “[admitted] their error in opposing military intervention in
Czechoslovakia.”102 While the Americans were speculating that these men would be dismissed in
due course, what went unsaid is that this represented a drift towards a more hard-line stance
within the Soviet Union; if such high-level officials were being compelled to change their
opinions in such a public fashion, then the Brezhnev Doctrine was there to stay, and there was no
telling when the Soviets would choose to enforce it again. However, it must be noted that
throughout the crisis, the Soviets maintained that Romania was safe from any threat of
invasion.103
Mănescu continued to work at keeping American paranoia high even before this
announcement, with his meeting with Ambassador Davis on September 6 leading Davis to warn
that the “danger was not entirely over.”104 Indeed, as late as November 22, US intelligence was
still putting out detailed reports of imminent invasion, including units slated to participate from
Warsaw Pact member nations.105
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Ceauşescu continued pushing all the right buttons to win his way even further into the
United States’ good graces, while also engaging in limited appeasement of Moscow. While
Soviet demands for adherence to Warsaw Pact guidelines were flatly rejected106, Ceauşescu did
tone down his rhetoric, and abandoned his outspoken denouncement of the invasion
altogether.107 Davis reported that Ceauşescu was in the process of liberalizing the Romanian
economy, albeit slowly, and was allowing for greater freedom of expression and civil rights than
ever before. Old political prisoners were being rehabilitated108, and the Securitate were being
held in check. From the American standpoint, Ceauşescu was turning out to be more of a
benevolent despot than an oppressive Stalinist dictator. Rusk and Davis were almost certainly
aware that these reforms did not represent a change in Ceauşescu’s personal convictions.
Ambassador Davis noted that he believed Ceauşescu would only go along with reforms until
they conflicted with his hold on power.109
As the disastrous year of 1968 drew to a close, there were very few winners left on the
field. The United States had received a black eye in Vietnam during the Tet Offensive early in
the year, and had proven to be all talk with its condemnation of the Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia, which in turn proved to severely tarnish Moscow’s image worldwide.
Czechoslovakia, despite experiencing a brief thaw, was plunged back into a Stalinist winter that
would last until the fall of the Eastern Bloc in 1989. Ceauşescu, however, had come out on top:
he had succeeded in redefining Romania’s relationship with the West in general and the United
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States in particular. He also managed to fully assert Romania’s right to an independent political
system without provoking a second invocation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, with its foreign,
domestic, and economic policies delivered from Bucharest rather than Moscow. The little
dictator’s stand against the Soviet monolith would end in paying off more than Ceauşescu could
have ever dreamed of.
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7. US-Romanian Relations Post-1968
In 1969, following a rather decisive election, a war weary America waved goodbye to
President Johnson and welcomed President Nixon to the White House. Nixon was to continue
Johnson’s support of Romania, not merely because it represented good policy, but in gratitude
for the warm reception given to him during his 1967 visit. Ceauşescu’s cultivation of Nixon paid
off, as the President paid an official state visit to Romania in August 1969.110 Nixon had other
motives for visiting Bucharest than simply thanking Ceauşescu for his earlier hospitality,
however. Nixon wanted to signal the Soviet government that the United States could be making a
change in policy regarding the People’s Republic of China, by visiting not just a European
Communist nation (in fact, Romania was the first Communist nation to be visited by any U. S.
President following the end of World War II),111 but the only member of the Eastern Bloc which
maintained friendly relations with the PRC. Nixon also availed himself of Romania’s strong
relations with North Vietnam, repeating an earlier ultimatum to Ceauşescu in the sure knowledge
that it would be passed on to the North Vietnamese.112
Nixon’s visit further cemented the relationship between the United States and Romania.
Following Nixon’s departure, Ceauşescu stated at a meeting of the Central Committee of the
Romanian Communist Party that, “…Nixon’s visit was good and useful… for the expansion of
relations between Romania and the United States”. Ceauşescu also remarked that, given the
United States’ recent actions towards securing better relations with the various communist states
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in the world, that Romania would, “have a lot to gain, generally vis-à-vis relations with socialist
countries and world peace.”113
Ceauşescu’s words turned out to be prophetic, albeit in a far more materialistic sense than
with which he spoke them. In 1969, Ceauşescu got American approval of his acquisition of a
Canadian nuclear reactor.114 While construction would not begin until 1979, it cannot be
emphasized enough that without the events of August 1968, it is extremely unlikely that
Ceauşescu would have received his reactor at all.115
It must be noted that American trust of Ceauşescu only extended so far, however; a cable
from the US Mission in Paris to the US Embassy in Ottawa made mention of the reactor sale,
and that the Canadians had been informed (unofficially) that US approval hinged on the reactor
being sold with IAEA safeguard built in, and that the reactor be of such a type as to not give
away advanced Western technological secrets to the Romanians. Only then would the US
support the reactor sale to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(CoCom).116
It must be further noted that the negotiations which took place during the Nixon and Ford
administrations coincided with another development in East-West relations: détente. Although
Johnson lost his chance to cement détente in the aftermath of the Warsaw pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia, Nixon proved to be much more fortunate, meeting with Brezhnev in 1972 and
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1973, signing the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) on the occasion of the former
visit.117Such developments in overall relations with the Soviet Union (as well as the thawing of
relations with the People’s Republic of China) would only have made Ceauşescu’s case easier to
sell. Earlier reactor deals were not allowed to proceed during a period of reduced, but still
present Cold War tensions. With said tensions passing away, at least for the moment, allowing
the sale of a nuclear reactor to a member of the Warsaw Pact became much more agreeable.
Not only did Ceauşescu succeed in getting exactly what he wanted from the West- and in
avoiding a Soviet attack– he also managed to outlast those champions of archconservatism,
Gomułka and Ulbricht: facing massive civil unrest, Gomułka was dismissed on Moscow’s orders
in 1970, with Ulbricht following a year later.118 His speech condemning the Warsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia continued to deliver dividends, both in the form of trade deals with
the Americans and other Western powers, and in the Western willingness to extend him credit.
This last benefit, however, was to end in costing him far more than it was worth.
During the 1970s, Romania attempted to modernize its economy, borrowing heavily from
the U.S. and other Western nations. Following the lackluster performance of Romanian goods in
Western markets, Romania found itself heavily indebted. Ceauşescu, quickly losing his earlier
popularity due to his liberal use of the Securitate to enforce policy, further decreased his
popularity when he adopted austerity measures in 1980 and continuing to enforce them until the
end of his reign. By 1989, Romania had paid off its Western creditors,119 but at great cost: the
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standard of living was abysmal after years of forcible export by the Romanian government of
vitally needed goods. Public resentment against the self-proclaimed “Genius of the Carpathians”
was so great120 that he became the only communist dictator to be violently overthrown and
executed in the wave of revolutions which swept Eastern Europe that year. The United States did
not allow its relationship with Romania to suffer the same death as Ceauşescu, however. By the
end of December, the United States Air Force was busily airlifting medical supplies and other aid
to Bucharest, in dire need of them following the violence at the end of the Ceauşescu era.121
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8. Conclusions
Nicolae Ceauşescu, more than any other person, advanced the cause of U.S.-Romanian
relations through the deliverance of his speech on August 21, 1968, in which he denounced the
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was the crowning achievement of years of hard
work in cultivating good relations not just with the U.S. government, but with American
politicians both in and out of office. Ceauşescu, at this stage in his political career, was a very
charismatic man, and was able to win the support of both his people and of Western
governments. While his people’s support was not quite so long-lived (much of this being his own
fault), his support in the West proved to be far more enduring. The image of Ceauşescu in his
prime, delivering his fateful condemnation of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia from
a balcony in Bucharest in 1968 would not be swept aside until 1989, when the old, bitter dictator
Ceauşescu lost control of his people, weary from nearly a decade of starvation and severe
repression, from that same balcony.
Ceauşescu, for all his faults (and they are glaring), is one of the key players in the history
of Romania’s industrialization. Without his sometimes frightening ability to sense shifting
political currents and ability to capitalize on the chances fate placed in front of him, it is very
likely that the gains of the Gheorghiu-Dej era would not have been so surpassed in the decades
following. Gheorghiu-Dej never received anywhere near the Western support that Ceauşescu did,
nor, for that matter, gained Romanian access to Western nuclear technology.
However, it must be stated that Ceauşescu did not achieve this all on his own; while the
recognition of his moment to make a public break with the other members of the Warsaw Pact
was his, the diplomatic exchanges in the years preceding his speech were what made it possible
in the first place. Due credit must be given to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Foreign Minister
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Corneliu Mănescu, whose mutual trust was able to serve as a bridge between the two countries
on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain during the 1968 crisis. The fact that close relations persisted
well after both men left their respective offices demonstrates just how strong the diplomatic ties
that they forged were. In the end, however, it was left to Ceauşescu to put the finishing touch on
their hard work, creating a relationship between the United States and Romania which would last
beyond the end of the Cold War.
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Appendix
Balcony Speech by Nicolae Ceauşescu on Czechoslovakia
August 21, 1968

Dear comrades, citizens of Romania. In this difficult moment for the situation in Europe
and for the fraternal Czechoslovak people, in the name of the Central Committee, of the State
Council, and of the government, I wish to address myself to you and express myself to you and
express our confidence in our people, who are aspiring to ensure the peaceful construction of
socialism.
We know, comrades, that the entry of the forces of the five socialist countries into
Czechoslovakia is a great error and a serious danger to peace in Europe and to the fate of
socialism in the world. It is inconceivable in today’s world, when the peoples are rising to the
struggle to defend their national independence and for equality in rights, that a socialist state, that
socialist states, should violate the freedom and independence of another state. There is no
justification whatsoever, and there can be no excuse for accepting even for a moment the idea of
military intervention in the affairs of a fraternal socialist state.
Our party-state delegation which last week visited Czechoslovakia convinced itself that
the Czechoslovak people, the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and the Czechoslovak workers’
class, old people, women, and young people, unanimously support the party and state leadership
in order to put right the negative state of affairs in Czechoslovakia inherited from the past, in
order to ensure the triumph of socialism in Czechoslovakia.
The problem of choosing the ways of socialist construction is a problem of each party, of
each state, and of every people, and nobody can set himself up as an adviser and guide for the
way in which socialism must be built. It is the affair of every people, and we deem that, in order
to place the relations between the socialist countries and Communist parties on a truly MarxistLeninist basis, it is necessary to put an end one and for all to interference in the affairs of other
states and other parties.
The measures which the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the State
Council have decided to adopt aim at submitting to the General National Assembly a declaration
in which we would set out clearly the relations we mean to build, our relations with the socialist
countries and with all the countries of the world, based on respect for independence and national
sovereignty, full equality in rights, and noninterference in internal affairs, and to base those
relations on a truly Marxist-Leninist collaboration which would contribute to the triumph of the
ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, to the triumph of communism, and to restoring the authority of
and confidence in Marxist-Leninist ideas.
We have today decided to set up armed patriotic guards made up of workers, peasants,
and intellectuals: defenders of the independence of our socialist fatherland. We want our people
to have their armed units in order to defend their revolutionary achievements and in order to
ensure their peaceful work and the independence and sovereignty of our socialist fatherland.
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In our activity, we proceed from the responsibility we have towards the people, towards
all the working people regardless of nationality- Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, and other
nationalities; we all- Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, people of other nationalities- have the
same destiny and the same aspiration: the forging of communism in our fatherland. We are
determined that in complete unity we shall ensure the attainment of our goals.
It has been said that in Czechoslovakia there was danger of counterrevolution; perhaps
tomorrow they will say that our meeting has mirrored counterrevolutionary tendencies. If so, we
answer to all that the Romanian people will not permit anybody to violate the territory of our
fatherland. Look comrades: Our whole Central Committee, the State Council, and the
Government are here. We are all determined to faithfully serve the people in socialist
construction and in defense of the revolutionary achievements and its independence. Many of
those here are Communists and antifascists who have faced prisons and death but have not
betrayed the interests of the workers’ class and our people. Be sure, comrades, be sure, citizens
of Romania, that we shall never betray our fatherland, that we shall not betray our people’s
interests.
We are confident that the Communist and workers’ parties will know how to find the way
to put the speediest end to this shameful event in the history of the revolutionary movements. We
are convinced that no Communist can be found who can accept this military action in
Czechoslovakia, that all the Communists would raise their voices to ensure the triumph of
freedom, the triumph of the Marxist-Leninist principles, so that Czechoslovak people, so that the
peoples, may be able to build socialist society as they themselves want it.
We are determined to act with all our force and with all our responsibility in order to
contribute to the finding of ways for the speediest solution of this situation created by the entry
of foreign forces into Czechoslovakia, and so that the Czechoslovak people can carry out their
activity in tranquility. We are firmly determined to act to that together with the other socialist
countries and with other Communist and workers’ parties we shall contribute to the elimination
of the divergences and to the strengthening of the unity of the socialist countries and of the
Communist parties because we are convinced that only in this way are we serving the interests of
the people and the interests of socialism in the whole world.
We ask the citizens of out fatherland that, having complete confidence in the leadership
of the party and the state and in our Communist party, they should give proof of complete unity
and act calmly and firmly, with everyone at his place of work, to increase his efforts and to
ensure the implementation of the program for the development of our socialist society, and to be
ready, comrades, at any moment to defend out socialist fatherland, Romania.
I thank you, all the citizens of the capital and all the citizens of our fatherland for your
confidence, for this warm manifestation, and for the attention to which you are watching our
party’s policy; and we wish you comrades good health and success in your activity for the
triumph of socialism in our fatherland.
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We request you, comrades, that you return to your work and have confidence that we
shall keep you informed regarding the unfolding of events. Good-bye.122
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